Review: Citizenship and the Pursuit of a Worthy Life by Pullano, Teresa
Citizenship and the Pursuit of the Worthy Life 
By David Thunder 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, xv+210 pp., ISBN: 978-1-107-
06893-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David Thunder’s book is a fascinating analysis of the ethics of 
citizenship under conditions of contemporary constitutional 
democracy. The essay can be easily read as a classical treaty on 
ethics and virtue in the polis, and it is probably the reason of the 
specific style that characterizes it, so different from the usual tone of 
most contemporary social science and political theory books: there is 
no jargon, no unnecessary difficult passages, but a flawless and 
always clear writing. Indeed, Thunder’s book has the great merit of 
proposing an ethical inquiry of civic engagement as a path towards 
human excellence. The main theme of Thunder’s enquiry is integrity, 
more than citizenship itself: a human life can be fully lived only 
through an exigent and relentless quest of a person’s main call, or, as 
the authors writes, ‘we might say that for the purposes of assessing 
the overall worth of a human life, what counts more than anything else 
is what a person is for’ (p. 25). This requires ethical integrity, defined 
as ‘a robust, enduring, and wholehearted commitment to integrate his 
desires, dispositions, actions, relationships and projects into what he 
responsibly and reflectively takes to be a worthy life’ (pp. 27-28). The 
institutions and the practices of citizenship are the framework through 
which ethical integrity can be expressed and learned. In the world of 
contemporary political reflection, the feeling of transcendence that is 
expressed by this definition of a worthy life is at the same time 
disconcerting, used as we are to judge political actions either by 
immanent rationality or by the structures of society itself, and 
refreshing. It may appear disconcerting for the reasons that Thunder 
himself acknowledges in the book: since modern political thought, we 
are used to separate ethical and political reflections. Indeed, 
questions that were asked by classical and medieval philosophers, 
such as Aristotle or St Augustin, have been expelled by the reflection 
of modern thinkers, like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke or Kant, given 
their belief that politics consists in guaranteeing the conditions of 
public order and justice, and for this purpose exigencies of morality 
were useless.   
Nevertheless, this theoretical heritage, together with the need, felt 
during the time of the European wars of religion, of separating private 
beliefs and the rules of public life, have produced a situation of 
apathy and disaffection in our constitutional democracies. The large 
part of the academic literature on citizenship deals with it as a set of 
legislation, as a formal institution or as a set of social practices, 
insulating it from ethical concerns. For Thunder, this is deeply 
problematic since it makes present democracy more vulnerable to 
those demagogues who understand that citizens need a sense of 
meaning and purpose in life, absent from an ethically emptied 
political scene. This situation contributes to the disaffection of citizens 
from political life, ‘insofar as it fails to anchor civic life and its 
demands in values that people care about and strive to honor on a 
day-to-day basis’(p. 191). Thunder is aware of the fact that what we 
may call ‘active citizenship’ is the privilege of a small part of the 
actual citizens of today’s democratic countries, since in post-
industrialised societies, civic engagement plays a peripheral role, 
given the actual division of labor. There is no need for the masses to 
be engaged into the public sphere, they can attend their everyday 
life, often made of private interests, while a small part takes care of 
the public good. The author is not naïve when it comes to depicting 
the concrete situation of political commitment under conditions of 
contemporary democracy. On the opposite, he is aware of the danger 
that represents a democratic regime that has no effective citizens, but 
only formal procedures, to sustain it. His thesis is founded upon the 
notion of citizenship as an interdependent and inter-relational 
category: it provides a basis for perceiving and exercising the 
responsibilities that we have toward those who share our social 
space. Respecting the rule of law, being committed to 
constitutionalism are not enough as formal principles, since 
democracy requires self-integration, as a regulative ideal of inner 
harmony, to be nourished.  
Thunder’s thesis of a continuity between the ethical dimension of a 
worthy life and the political practice of citizenship rests upon two 
main hypothesis: the distinction between the ethical and the moral 
perspective, and the critique of the separation between individual 
autonomy and the social context. Let’s take into account the first one: 
the ethical standpoint is always connected to the quest for human 
excellence, although not in an atomistic way, but taking into account 
the social context. The connection between the inner values and the 
social context is precisely what distinguishes it from the ‘moral’ point 
of view, which is instead constituted by the obligations towards the 
others and only marginally by the agent’s character. This first 
distinction leads Thunder to a critique of the dominant approaches in 
political theory, namely John Rawl’s political liberalism, according to 
which citizenship is interpreted as ‘a role that enables us to achieve 
certain instrumental goods (wealth, personal security) or to honor our 
obligations toward others or to secure the exigencies of a just and 
stable social and political order’ (p. 10). Thunder’s critique of John 
Rawls and of general approaches that separate the ethical point of 
view from the moral and political ones is the object of the book’s 
fourth chapter. It is indeed a merit of the book that it does not take for 
granted mainstream approaches in political theory, in particular 
political liberalism, but it opens up a more substantial ethical and 
political account of contemporary citizenship. Separatist approaches, 
such as the ones exemplified by John Rawls and Reinhold Niebuhr, 
argue that political action is governed by distinctive purposes and 
principles that must be partially insulated, for practical purposes, 
from conceptions of a well lived human life.  Thunder criticizes 
Rawls’s separation between theories of the good (which should be 
influenced by contingencies) and theories of justice (which should be 
not). He also discusses Niebuhr’s thesis concerning the necessity of 
departing, in the tasks of a citizen or statesmen, from the structures of 
‘a sensitive conscience’ devoted to unselfishness and love (p.109). 
Thunder’s approach is much more contextual and attentive to the 
social dimension of political theory that classical political liberalism. 
This is what he calls a ‘situated approach’, which is ‘firmly grounded 
in the actual and contingent situation of persons. According to this 
approach, the appropriate starting point for evaluating citizenship is 
not the ethical appeal of citizenship in some carefully restricted 
choice situation such as Locke’s ‘state of nature’ or Rawls’ ‘original 
position’, but the actual situation we find ourselves in, including our 
existing history, institutions, relationships and realistic opportunities 
for action’ (p. 140). 
The international and situated character of Thunder’s approach is 
his main advantage towards classical political liberalism when it 
comes to discussing contemporary citizenship. The main limits of 
Thunder’s book are, in my view, the little attention he pays to the 
other part of the continuum between ethics and politics, that is 
politics. Indeed, citizenship is very well investigated in its ethical 
dimension, and this is the original and refreshing contribution of his 
book, but very little is said on the political dimension of this practice. 
The argument of the book would have been enriched by a boldest 
step into the realm of the effective conditions of civic engagement 
under contemporary democracies, to then come back to its ethical 
counterpart.  
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